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Association for Accessible Medicines v. Brian E. 
Frosh: Judicially Created Principles or State Action 
to Protect Citizens from Unconscionable Drug 
Prices 
RYAN A. MCAULIFFE*© 
ABSTRACT 
This note examines the holding in Association for Accessible Medicines v. Brian E. 
Frosh which was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
The Fourth Circuit struck down Maryland’s Anti-Price Gouging Statue (“the Act”) as 
a dormant Commerce Clause violation. This note will argue that the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding was incorrect, and the Act should have been upheld under Maryland’s great 
public interest in regulating the price of generic prescription drugs to protect its 
citizens’ health and welfare. This note will begin with an analysis of the legal 
background concerning the extraterritoriality principle of the dormant Commerce 
Clause in relation to price control statutes. The note will then argue that the Fourth 
Circuit incorrectly applied the extraterritoriality principle to find a per se violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause, and that the Act should have been upheld because 
Maryland’s consumer protection interests in protecting citizens from 
unconscionable drug price increases outweighs any burdens the Act would have 
placed on interstate commerce. Finally, the note will highlight the Supreme Court, 
the Fourth Circuit, and Sister Courts’ conflicting limitations of the extraterritoriality 
principle in modern commerce. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Association for Accessible Medicines v. Brain E. Frosh,1 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the District Court for the District 
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 1. 887 F.3d 664 (decided April 13, 2018). 
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of Maryland’s dismissal of the Association for Accessible Medicines’ (“AAM”) claim 
that Maryland’s Anti-Price Gouging Statute2 (“the Act”) was unconstitutional under 
the dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”) was correct.3 The Court ruled that the Act 
violated the DCC because it would directly regulate the price of drug transactions 
that occurred outside Maryland,4 even though the Act would only be triggered 
when there was a drug made for sale within Maryland’s borders.5 The Court 
incorrectly applied the extraterritoriality principle of the DCC to conclude that the 
Act impacted transactions that occurred entirely outside of Maryland, implicated a 
price control as opposed to an upstream pricing impact, and burdened the 
interstate commerce of prescription drugs.6 
The Court’s incorrect application of the extraterritoriality principle can be 
understood after first examining the case itself, the legal background, and then 
reviewing both the majority and dissent’s reasoning and analyses.7 It will become 
clear that the Court’s holding was an incorrect application of the extraterritoriality 
principle, because Maryland’s great public interest in regulating the price of generic 
prescription drugs to protect and promote its citizens health and welfare outweighs 
any burdens placed on interstate commerce.8 
I.  THE CASE   
On May 27, 2017, the Maryland General Assembly passed House Bill No. 631 (“HB 
631”), Maryland’s Anti-Price Gouging Statute, for the purpose of prohibiting 
manufacturers and wholesale distributors of pharmaceuticals from engaging in 
price gouging in the sale of generic drugs.9 The bill became effective on October 1, 
2017,10 and was codified in MD Code, Health – General §§ 2-801-803.11 
The Association for Accessible Medicines12 is a voluntary organization of 
prescription drug manufacturers, wholesale distributors, and other entities in the 
 
 2. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH §§ 2-801-803. 
 3. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 666. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, slip op. at 6 (D. Md. Sep. 29, 2017). 
 6. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 671–75. 
 7. See infra, Parts II, III. 
 8. See infra, Part IV. 
 9. H.B. 631, 437th Sess. (Md. 2017). 
 10. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 666. The governor of Maryland refused to sign the bill due to constitutional and 
other concerns. Id. 
 11. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH §§ 2-801-803. 
 12. ASSOCIATION FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES, https://accessiblemeds.org/about (last visited Feb. 3, 2019) (“The 
Association for Accessible Medicines improves access to safe, quality and effective medicine.” Additionally, “as 
manufacturers of 9 out of every 10 prescriptions dispensed in the U.S., members of the Association for 
Accessible Medicines form an integral, and powerful, part of the healthcare system.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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pharmaceutical industry.13 On July 6, 2017, AAM challenged the Act in the District 
Court of Maryland, seeking an “action for declaratory and injunctive relief under 
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”14 AAM alleged that the Act’s application to the sale 
of drugs between out-of-state manufacturers and out-of-state wholesale 
distributors violated the DCC.15 On September 29, 2017, the district court ultimately 
dismissed AAM’s DCC claims, denying, inter alia, its motions for preliminary 
injunction and dismissal.16 
Subsequently, AAM filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, appealing the district court’s dismissal of its DCC challenge and 
refusal to enjoin enforcement of the statute on the basis that it was 
unconstitutionally vague.17 
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.   Pattern and Practice: Industry-Wide Unconscionable Generic Drug Price 
Increases 
The Maryland General Assembly passed HB 631 to protect the people of Maryland 
from “the imposition of unconscionable price increases” of generic drugs that 
resulted from market dysfunction or failure.18 The General Assembly’s proposal, 
passage, and enactment of the Act followed the release of two reports compiled by 
the federal government.19 The first report, entitled Sudden Price Spikes in Off-
Patent Prescription Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms Patients, 
Taxpayers, and the U.S. Health Care system, was released by the Senate’s 
Committee on Aging.20 The second report, entitled Generic Drugs Under Medicare: 
Part D Generic Drug Prices Declined Overall, but Some Had Extraordinary Price 
Increases, was released by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”).21 
The Senate’s report investigated dramatic price increases in certain generic 
drugs and examined the circumstances surrounding extraordinary increases.22 The 
 
 13. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 667. 
 14. Frosh, slip op. at 1. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Frosh, slip op. at 15. 
 17. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 666. 
 18. Frosh, slip op. at 1. 
 19. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 675. 
 20. S. REP. NO. 114-429 (2016). 
 21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-706, GENERIC DRUGS UNDER MEDICARE: Part D Generic Drug 
Prices Declined Overall, but Some Had Extraordinary Price Increases (2016). 
 22. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 676. The report investigated the price increase of seven generic drugs that did not 
have patent protection for decades and were sold by four generic pharmaceutical companies. Two of those 
pharmaceutical companies were formed and managed by the since-convicted investor Martin Shkreli. Id.; see 
also, Dan Mangan, ‘Pharma bro’ Martin Shkreli sentenced to 7 years in prison – says, ‘This is my fault’, CNBC 
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Senate’s report concluded that all four of the companies investigated “followed a 
common ‘business model’ in acquiring and marketing” their drugs.23 In particular, 
the Senate found that each extraordinary increase involved four common factors: 
A single-source generic drug; the drug was distributed through a closed distribution 
system;24 the drug was essential to, or the “gold standard” for; the treatment of a 
rare condition.25  The Senate report determined that the four common factors 
allowed each company to create a de facto monopoly of the pricing power of their 
generic drug – allowing them to impose unconscionable price increases.26   
The GAO’s report investigated trends in pricing for Medicare Part D covered 
generic drugs.27 The report found that 315 of the 1,441 established drugs they 
studied experienced an extortionary price increase of at least 100 percent.28 For 
example, piroxicam “a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug that can be used to 
treat rheumatoid arthritis or osteoarthritis, increased by more than 2,000 percent, 
from $0.09 per capsule in first quarter 2010 to $1.94 per capsule in first quarter 
2011.”29 Additionally, the GAO discovered through stakeholder interviews that if a 
generic drug served a small patient population, it was more susceptible to price 
increases because there was little financial incentive for competitors to enter the 
market.30 Furthermore, the stakeholders reported that “supplier and buyer 
consolidation can drive price increases” because of difficulties created in 
manufacturing generic drugs.31 
As a result of these reports, the Maryland General Assembly pursued legislation 
to fight and prevent further cases of abusive pricing practices by generic 
pharmaceutical companies.32 The following section will discuss the General 
Assembly’s passage of the Act, and the enforcement powers the Act gave the 
Maryland Attorney General’s Office. 
 
(Mar. 9, 2018, 1:56 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/09/pharma-bro-martin-shkreli-sentenced-to-7-
years-in-prison.html. 
 23. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 676. 
 24. Martin Shkreli’s drug distribution strategy blocks generic competitors, CBC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2016, 1:38 
PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/drug-generics-distribution-1.3474384) (“Shkreli had the perfect 
weapon: a tightly-controlled distribution system which would make it virtually impossible for a competitor to 
obtain enough Daraprim to develop their own version.”). 
 25. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 676. 
 26. Id. at 676–77 (“And because the generic drugs treat a ‘rare’ condition ‘the patient population 
dependent upon them [is] too small to organize effective opposition to the price increase.’”). 
 27. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 675–76. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See supra, note 21, at 17. 
 30. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 676. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 677. 
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B.   An Act Concerning Public Health: Maryland’s Generic Pharmaceutical Anti-
Price Gouging Statute 
The prohibition against price gouging for essential off-patent or generic drugs 
became effective on October 1, 2017 and codified in MD Code—Health §§ 2-801-
803.33 Section 2-802 states: 
(a) A manufacturer or wholesale distributor may not engage in price 
gouging in the sale of an essential off-patent or generic drug. (b) It is not 
a violation of subsection (a) of this section for a wholesale distributor to 
increase the price of an essential off-patent or generic drug if the price 
increase is directly attributable to additional costs for the drug imposed 
on the wholesale distributor by the manufacturer of the drug.34 
Moreover, Maryland’s Anti-Price Gouging Statute defined critical terms, such as 
“essential off-patent or generic drug,” “price gouging,” and “unconscionable 
increase.”35 The Act defined essential off-patent or generic drug as: “any 
prescription drug (i) for which all exclusive marketing rights, if any, granted under 
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 351 of the federal Public Health Service 
Act, and federal patent law have expired . . . (iii) that is actively manufactured and 
marketed for sale in the United States by three or fewer manufacturers ; and (iv) 
that is made available for sale in the State.”36 Price gouging was defined as “an 
unconscionable increase in the price of a prescription drug.”37 Next, the Act stated 
that “unconscionable increase means an increase in the price of a prescription drug 
that: (1) is excessive and not justified by the cost of producing the drug or the cost 
of appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote health; and (2) results in 
a consumer for whom the drug has been prescribed having no meaningful choice 
about whether to purchase the drug at an excessive price because of: (i) the 
importance of the drug to their health; and (ii) insufficient competition in the 
market for the drug.”38 
The Act gave enforcement powers to the Maryland Attorney General’s Office.39 
Those powers included: the power to petition the Circuit Court to enter an 
injunction for violations of the statute; return money to consumers that resulted 
from violations of the Act; require violating manufacturers  to dispense the drug 
through any state health program at the drug’s last permissible price for up to one 
 
 33. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH §§ 2-801-803. 
 34. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-802. 
 35. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-801. 
 36. Id. (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-803. 
 Association for Accessible Medicines v. Brian E. Frosh 
194 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
year; and order civil penalties of up to $10,000.40 Furthermore, manufacturers 
alleged to have violated the Act would not be permitted to raise a defense “that the 
person did not deal directly with a consumer residing in the State.”41 
Through bipartisan support, the Act gave the Attorney General’s Office powers 
to intervene when the market failed to function as expected, such as allowing drug 
makers to charge hundreds or even thousands of dollars for drugs that were 
“manufactured for pennies a pill.”42 In passing the Act, the General Assembly passed 
what was a “first-in-the nation measure” to protect consumers from shocking drug 
price increases.43 
 C.   Extraterritoriality Principle of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
As clearly established in the text and structure of the Constitution itself, Congress 
holds the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the 
several States.”44 From this explicit power, the implicit power of the judicial doctrine 
known as the Dormant Commerce Clause arose.45 
The  doctrine came to fruition out of the Court’s long recognition that the 
Commerce Clause holds within it an implicit limitation on states’ powers “to enact 
legislation affecting interstate commerce.”46 Thus, the DCC “prohibits States from 
legislating in ways that impeded the flow of interstate commerce.”47 Among the 
ways states could impede the flow of interstate commerce were by passing 
legislation or regulations aimed at economic protectionism.48 Economic 
protectionism is legislation or regulations “designed to benefit in-state economic 
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”49 
Additionally, the Supreme Court developed the extraterritoriality principle of the 
DCC from its holdings in Baldwin,50 Brown-Forman,51 and Healy.52 The judicially 
created extraterritoriality principle of the DCC prohibits states from regulating 
 
 40. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-803; Frosh, 887 F.3d at 678. 
 41. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-803; Frosh, 887 F.3d at 677. 
 42. Ian Duncan, Maryland General Assembly passes bill aimed at ‘price gouging’, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 
10, 2017, 2:55 PM) http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-drug-price-gouging-
20170410-story.html) (“During floor debates on the Act, Republicans questioned whether the attorney 
general’s office had sufficient expertise to take on the new role, but ultimately many Republicans in both the 
House and the Senate voted for the measure.”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
 45. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 667. 
 46. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 326. n.1 (1989). 
 47. Star Scientific Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d. 339, 355 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 48. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 667. 
 49. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988). 
 50. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
 51. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
 52. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
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commerce that occurs entirely outside of their borders.53 The Supreme Court has 
held that the extraterritoriality principle is violated if a state statute or regulation 
“expressly applies to out-of-state commerce . . . or it has that practical effect, 
regardless of the [state]’s intent.”54 
In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, the Supreme Court recognized the extraterritoriality 
doctrine of preventing burdens on interstate commerce.55 The Supreme Court 
reasoned that it is an established doctrine that “a state may not, in any form or 
under any guise, directly burden the prosecution of interstate business.”56 Applying 
this principle, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ orders granting the 
relief sought by the plaintiffs from the New York Milk Control Act, which set up a 
system of minimum prices to be paid by distributors to manufacturers.57 The 
Supreme Court further reasoned that New York “ha[d] no power to project its 
legislation” into other states “by regulating the prices to be paid” in those states.58 
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that New York could not use either its taxing or 
police powers to establish “an economic barrier against competition with the 
products of another state or the labor of its residents.”59 
Fifty-one years later, in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
the Supreme Court applied the extraterritoriality balancing test to a state’s price 
control legislation to hold that it did not facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce.60 Here, the Supreme Court reasoned that when a statute “has only 
indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly,” the Court 
must weigh the state’s legitimate interest and local benefits against the burdens on 
interstate commerce.61 Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized that “the most 
important issue was whether [a] statute regulated out-of-state transactions.”62 The 
Supreme Court applied this reasoning to hold that the New York liquor affirmation 
 
 53. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 667. 
 54. Id. at 668. 
 55. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522. 
 56. Id. (citing International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 112 (1910)). 
 57. See id. at 519 (the substance of the provision was that “there shall be no sale within the state of milk 
bought outside unless the price paid to the producers was one that would be lawful upon a like transaction 
within the state.”). 
 58. Id. at 521. 
 59. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527 (the court found New York’s legislation to be the “equivalent of rampart 
customs duties designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the place of origin,” and were “thus hostile in 
conception as well as burdensome in result.”). 
 60. See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579 (“When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against 
interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, [the 
Court] has generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.”). 
 61. Id. at 579 (“The critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate 
activity.”) 
 62. Id. at 581. 
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statute regulated out-of-state transactions in violation of the Commerce Clause.63 
In striking down the New York liquor control law, the Court concluded that although 
“a state may seek lower prices for its consumers, it may not insist that producers or 
consumers in other states surrender whatever competitive advantages they may 
possess.”64 
Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc. later reaffirmed the extraterritoriality principle 
established by the Supreme Court.65 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, 
reiterated that a state cannot create commerce legislation or regulation that occurs 
“wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects 
within the State.”66 If the statute on its face directly controls commerce entirely 
outside of its borders then there is no question that it is invalid, but if this reach is 
not clear, then the “critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation 
is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the state.”67 The Supreme Court 
articulated that the practical effect of a statute is evaluated by considering not only 
the “consequences of the statute itself, but also . . . how the statute may interact 
with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States.”68  Through this reasoning, 
the Supreme Court concluded that Connecticut’s price-affirmation statute had “the 
undeniable effect of controlling,” commercial activity that occurred entirely outside 
of the state.69 Additionally, the practical effect of the price affirmation law, along 
with similar laws enacted throughout the country, was to create “just the kind of 
competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause 
was meant to preclude.”70 Therefore, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 
Commerce Clause precludes states from depriving businesses and consumers in 
other states of competitive advantages that they possess based on their local 
interests.71 
 
 63. See id. at 582. (the New York liquor affirmation statute regulated out-of-state transactions by “forcing 
a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another,” thus directly 
regulating commerce). 
 64. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 580. 
 65. Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
 66. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. (“Specifically, a State may not adopt legislation that has the practical effect of 
establishing a ‘scale of prices for use in other states.’”). 
 67. Id. at 336. 
 68. Id. at 336–37 (“Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation 
arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.”). 
 69. Id. (Connecticut’s statute required out-of-state shippers of beer to affirm that their posted prices for 
products sold to Connecticut wholesalers be no higher than the prices at which those products were being sold 
in the bordering States). 
 70. Id. at 337. 
 71. Healy, 491 U.S. at 339. 
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D. The Supreme Court’s Limitation of Extraterritoriality to Price Control and 
Price Affirmation Statutes   
In 2003, the Supreme Court departed from its long-held application of the 
extraterritoriality principle in Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of America v. Walsh.72 In 
Walsh, the Court reviewed a challenge by an association of “nonresident drug 
manufacturers” to the Maine Rx program.73 The Maine Rx program was passed by 
Maine’s legislature in 2003 with the primary intent of “provid[ing] discounted 
prescription drugs” to Maine citizens.74 
The association of drug manufacturers challenged the Maine Rx program on two 
grounds, alleging first that the program was preempted by the Medicaid statute, 
and second that it violated the Commerce Clause.75 The drug manufacturers 
association grounded its preemption challenge on a prior authorization76 
requirement Maine added for prescription drugs.77 In granting the manufacturers’ 
motion for preliminary injunction, the district court, “without resolving any factual 
issues,” held that “Maine had not just passed a statute that conflicted with federal 
Medicaid legislation, but it had actually taken the federal Medicaid program and 
altered it to serve Maine’s local purposes.”78 
However, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overturned the district court’s 
analysis of the preemption issue, and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the 
holding.79 The Supreme Court reasoned that the record did not demonstrate “that 
 
 72. Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003). 
 73. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 649–50 (after Congress “enacted [a] cost-saving measure in 1990, requir[ing] drug 
companies to pay rebates to States on their Medicaid purchases,” several state legislatures enacted 
“supplemental rebate programs to achieve additional cost savings on Medicaid purchases as well as for 
purchases made by other needy citizens,” one being the Maine Rx program). 
 74. Id. at 649. 
 75. Id. at 650. 
 76. See id. at 650–51 (when Congress first created the Medicaid program in 1965 it “did not specifically 
address outpatient prescription drug coverage” . . . instead it established “regulations and guidelines [that] ‘set 
upper limits on each State’s aggregate expenditures for drugs.’” Additionally, with approval by the Secretary, 
states “designed and administrated their own formularies” concerning prescription drugs, including prior 
authorization programs “that required approval by a state agency to qualify a doctor’s prescription for 
reimbursement.”). 
 77. See id. at 656 (before the commencement of the Maine Rx Program, “the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America, an association representing manufacturers  that ‘account for more than 75 percent 
of brand name drug sales in the United States,’” brought its action in part based off of three affidavits that 
commented on the “operation of prior authorization programs administered by private managed care 
organizations, describing their actual and potential adverse impact on both manufacturers  and patients.”). 
 78. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 658–59. (the District Court reasoned that the prior authorization program amounted 
to an “alteration [that] served purposes outside the scope of the Medicaid program and created an obstacle to 
the administration of the federal program [that] was sufficient to establish preemption” . . . because the 
obstacle was one in which “drugs on the list must be approved by the state Medicaid Medical Director before 
they can be dispensed.”). 
 79. Id. at 668. 
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prior authorization would have a significant adverse impact on the manufacturers 
of brand name prescription drugs,” but instead would result in some administrative 
costs to physicians.80 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the question of 
whether prior authorization by the Secretary must be sought before the Maine Rx 
program could go into effect was not dispositive, and therefore the Supreme Court 
“offer[ed] no view as to whether it would be proper for the Secretary to disallow 
funding for the Maine Medicaid program if Maine fails to seek approval from the 
Secretary of its Maine Rx Program.”81 
Moreover, the Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals holding that the 
Maine Rx program did not violate the DCC.82 The Supreme Court held that the court 
of appeals correctly distinguished the Maine Rx Program from its DCC jurisprudence 
concerning price affirmation statutes.83 The manufacturers’ Commerce Clause 
challenge focused on the potential effects to manufacturers that would result if 
they complied with the Maine Rx Program.84 The Supreme Court reasoned that 
there was no burden placed on commerce by the Maine Rx Program because “the 
alleged harm to interstate commerce would be the same regardless of whether the 
manufacturer[s] compliance was voluntary or the product of coercion.”85 
Additionally, the Maine Rx Program did not regulate out-of-state transactions by 
“insisting that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain price.”86 
Therefore, the Supreme Court found that the extraterritoriality principle that was 
applied in Baldwin and Healy did not apply to this case, because “unlike the price 
control or price affirmation statutes” the Maine Rx program did not expressly or 
inevitably affect “regulat[ing] the price of any out-of-state transaction.”87 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland’s dismissal of AAM’s complaint, holding that Maryland’s 
Anti-Price Gouging Statute violated the DCC because it regulated price transactions 
that occur outside of Maryland.88 Judge Thacker wrote the majority opinion, in 
 
 80. Id. (“The impact on the manufacturers  is not relevant because any transfer of business to less 
expensive products will produce savings for the Medicaid program. The impact on doctors may be significant if 
it produces an administrative burden that affects the quality of their treatment of patients, but no such effect 
has been proved.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 660. 
 83. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 669–70; Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669. 
 84. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 665–66. 
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which Judge Agee joined, and supported his holding by applying the 
extraterritoriality principle of the DCC to the Maryland statute.89 Judge Wynn 
dissented on the grounds that the Act was a constitutional application of the State’s 
police powers and authority to protect its citizens from unconscionable generic 
drug prices, and not a violation of the extraterritoriality principle.90 
 A.   The Majority Found A Per Se Violation of the Extraterritoriality Principle 
The majority opened its ruling by discussing the legislative and procedural history 
of the Maryland Anti-Price Gouging Statute.91 The majority walked through the 
relevant portions of the statute, including the definitions of key terms, and the 
proposed enforcement mechanisms.92 Additionally, the majority discussed the 
Maryland legislature’s passage of the statute in response to the release of the two 
federal government reports,93 the governor’s refusal to sign the statute, and the 
July 6, 2017 filing of AAM’s DCC challenge.94 
The majority reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, “accepting [AAM’s] 
well pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inference in [AAM’s] 
favor.”95 Judge Thacker reiterated the classic DCC jurisprudence, stating that the 
federal government’s power to restrain states from enacting legislation that 
“interferes or burdens” interstate commerce was driven by the Supreme Court’s 
concerns about economic protectionism.96 The extraterritoriality principle of the 
DCC arose out of the principle that states cannot regulate commerce that occurs 
entirely outside of their borders.97 Therefore, a state’s legislation would violate “the 
extraterritoriality principle if it either expressly applies to out-of-state commerce 
. . . or has that ‘practical effect,’ regardless of the legislature’s intent.”98 
First, the majority walked through extraterritoriality principle jurisprudence 
established in Brown-Forman, Healy, and Baldwin.99 The Court placed great reliance 
on the Supreme Court’s Healy outline of the principle against extraterritoriality.100 
In Healy, the Supreme Court reasoned that; (1) a state law cannot regulate 
commerce that takes place entirely outside of its state; (2) a statute that directly 
controls out-of-state commerce is invalid regardless of the legislature’s intent, and 
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to determine this, courts must look to the practical effect of the legislation; and (3) 
when weighing the practical effect of the legislation, the court looks to both the 
consequences of the statute itself and how the statute could affect the legitimate 
regulatory regimes of states if other states passed similar legislation.101 
The court then moved on to address Maryland’s argument that the Supreme 
Court limited the extraterritoriality principle to price affirmation statutes in 
Walsh.102 The majority acknowledged that “the rules that applied in Baldwin and 
Healy” were not applicable to the Maine Rx program, because “unlike price control 
or price affirmation statutes,” Maine’s program did not directly or inevitably 
regulate the prices of transactions that occurred outside of Maine’s borders.103 
However, the majority reasoned that Maryland’s argument that the 
extraterritoriality principle was limited to only price affirmation statutes was 
incorrect.104 The Court reiterated that Maine’s Rx program only affected the prices 
of drug transactions that occurred within Maine, and then pointed to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Edger v. MITE Corp.105 In MITE Corp., the Supreme Court held a 
non-price affirmation statute that directly regulated transactions that occurred 
across state lines, in relation to corporate takeovers of companies in which at least 
ten percent of the shares were owned by Illinois residents, violated the principle 
against extraterritoriality.106 Therefore, the majority concluded that Maryland’s 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Walsh was too narrow.107 
The majority then turned to the “merits of AAM’s dormant commerce clause 
challenge.”108 The majority focused on the “made available for sale” language of the 
Act’s definition of “essential off-patent or generic drug.”109 The majority, reasoned 
that this language did not limit the Act to sales that occurred within Maryland, and 
did not restrict the Act’s “operation to the context of a resale transaction with a 
Maryland consumer.”110 Additionally, the majority noted that Maryland 
acknowledged during oral arguments that the conduct violating the Act was 
intended to reach “upstream consumer retail sales,” which would “occur almost 
exclusively outside Maryland.”111 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 669–70. 
 104. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 670. 
 105. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 US 624 (1982). 
 106. See Frosh, 887 F.3d at 668, 670 (the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. held that an Illinois law that 
allowed the Secretary of State to reject a tender offer, even to shares not owned by Illinois shareholders of a 
corporate takeover of the shares of a target company, violated the extraterritoriality principle of the dormant 
commerce clause). 
 107. Frosh, 887 F.3d at 670. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 671. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 RYAN A. MCAULIFFE 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 201 
Judge Thacker also analyzed the Act’s structure.112 Here, the majority reasoned 
that the Act was fixated on the “lawfulness of a price increase [that] is measured 
according to the price the manufacturer or wholesaler charges in the initial sale of 
the drug,” which clearly targeted the “upstream pricing and sale of prescription 
drugs” that occur outside of Maryland.113 Thus, the majority concluded that the Act 
would “compel manufacturers and wholesalers” to comply with the law outside of 
Maryland.114 
Through this compulsion to comply with the Maryland Act, the majority found 
the practical effect of the Act to be the specification of the prices of drugs that could 
be sold outside Maryland.115 The majority reasoned that the Act aimed “to override 
prescription drug manufacturers reaction to the market and to regulate the prices 
these manufacturers could charge for their products.”116 Therefore, the 
fundamental problem with the Act was that it would do more than impact upstream 
pricing.117 
Next, the majority held that if multiple states enacted similar legislation, it could 
“subject prescription drug manufacturers to conflicting state requirements.”118 The 
majority reasoned that manufacturers would have to modify their distribution 
systems to enter into separate transactions for each state in order to remain in 
compliance with the different state pricing acts.119 Therefore, the majority found 
the possibility of “the kind of competing and interlocking local economic regulation 
that the Commerce Clause was meant to preclude” significantly realistic.120 
In sum, the majority found Maryland’s Act to be a violation of the DCC because 
it would control the pricing of transactions that occurred outside of Maryland.121 
However, the majority specifically stated that their holding should not be 
interpreted as preventing states from enacting legislation to “secure lower 
prescription drug prices for their citizens.”122 Ultimately, however, the majority 
reversed the district court’s dismissal of AAM’s challenge, holding that that Act was 
“not triggered by any conduct that takes place in Maryland,” the Act “control[led] 
the prices of transactions. . .outside of the state,” and if other states began to enact 
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similar legislation, it would create a “significant burden on interstate commerce 
involving prescription drugs.”123 
B.  The Dissent Argued That the Act is Not a per se Violation and is a 
Constitutional Exercise of State Authority 
The dissent first argued that Maryland’s legislature has the authority to protect its 
citizens from the unconscionable drug pricing of out-of-state generic drug 
manufacturers under its general police powers.124 The dissent reasoned that 
Maryland’s Act was constitutional because the Act “[did] not implicate the concerns 
that lie at the heart of the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.”125 The dissent began its analysis of the Act by reiterating the serious 
concerns outlined in the two federal government reports and reviewing the 
language of the Act itself.126 
The dissent then argued that the Act was triggered only by conduct occurring 
within Maryland. Moreover, the dissent disagreed with that majority’s conclusion 
that the Act did not “require a nexus to an actual sale in Maryland.”127 The dissent 
pointed to the State’s repeated representations that the Act was not meant to 
“reach any stream of commerce that does not end in Maryland” to conclude that 
the Act’s construction was never intended to reach nonapplicable streams of 
commerce.128 The dissent reasoned that Maryland represented that the Act was 
only triggered when drugs were made available for sale within Maryland, and 
controlling Maryland law dictated that unless expressly stated otherwise by the 
legislature, the intent of the legislation “will be presumed not to have any 
extraterritorial effect.”129 
The dissent further argued that AAM’s DCC challenge was without merit for 
numerous reasons.130 The dissent began by reminding the majority that the 
extraterritoriality doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that expresses states 
prohibition from regulating “commerce occurring wholly outside” of a state’s 
boundaries.131 Additionally, the dissent noted a concurring opinion from the Sixth 
Circuit holding that “there has never been a single Supreme Court dormant 
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Commerce Clause holding that relied exclusively on the extraterritoriality doctrine 
to invalidate a state law.”132 In addition, the dissent reasoned that parallel to a 
recent trend of sustaining state regulations that might be in conflict with the DCC, 
the Supreme Court’s modern definition of commerce encompasses all transactions 
in the stream of commerce, and the legislation would only impact commerce 
negatively if it regulated a transaction in a stream of commerce that never took 
place in Maryland.133 
Furthermore, the dissent took the position that the holdings from Baldwin, 
Healy, and Brown-Forman, which the majority relied on, all turned on the principle 
concerns of economic protectionism, discrimination against interstate commerce, 
and state regulation of transactions that never enter the concerned state.134 Not a 
single one of those cases held that nondiscriminatory state legislation “regulating 
an upstream transaction in a stream of transactions that ends in the State” 
constituted a violation of the extraterritoriality principle of the DCC.135 Thus, the 
dissent concluded that the extraterritoriality doctrine applied only to “price control 
or price affirmation statutes” that connect the prices being charged in-state with 
those being charged out-of-state that discriminate against interstate commerce.136 
Finally, the dissent argued that Maryland should be entitled to regulate prices 
charged for essential generic drugs under their strong public interest and police 
powers as long as the Act did “not favor in-state transactions at the expense of out-
of-state interests or discriminate against interstate commerce.”137 The dissent 
supported its argument by noting other states’ consumer protection laws that 
regulate the prices of manufacturers  of non-pharmaceutical goods that survived 
extraterritoriality challenges.138 Ultimately, the heart of the dissent’s closing 
analysis was rooted in the fact that the Act did not “compel manufacturers to sell 
prescription drugs” at a specific price, but instead, under the legislature’s 
representation of the public interest, “forbid manufacturers  from imposing an 
‘unconscionable’ price increase for essential generic drugs.”139 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, the Fourth Circuit held that 
Maryland’s anti-price gouging statute was an unconstitutional violation of the 
extraterritoriality principle of the DCC.140 The Court’s judgment was incorrect in this 
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case because it erroneously applied the extraterritoriality principle to find a per se 
violation of the DCC, and thus failed to weigh Maryland’s strong public interest in 
regulating generic prescription drug manufacturers.141 Additionally, there has been 
conflicting applications and limitations of the extraterritoriality principle of the DCC 
from the Supreme Court and across several circuits.142 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit 
should have applied the balancing test of the extraterritoriality principle to find that 
Maryland’s interest in protecting its citizens from unconscionable drug price 
increases greatly outweighs any burden that might be placed on the interstate 
commerce of drug manufacturers and distributors.143 
 A.  The Majority Incorrectly Applied the Extraterritoriality Principle to the Act 
Writing for the majority, Judge Thacker incorrectly held that the Act was a DCC 
violation merely because “it directly regulates transactions that take place outside 
of Maryland.”144 The majority’s holding failed to properly consider the two-tiered 
legal standard established in DCC jurisprudence, which was relied on by the district 
court.145 
As stated in Brown-Forman, the first tier of the test asks the court to inquire 
whether the “state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate 
commerce, or [is] its effect [] to favor in-state economic interest over out-of-state 
interest.”146 If either is found, the court should strike down the legislation without 
further inquiry.147 However, where a state statute “does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce but ‘regulates even-handedly’ and only incidentally affects 
interstate commerce,” then the court moves to the second tier of the DCC 
analysis.148 Under this second tier, the court conducts a balancing test, weighing the 
legitimacy of the state’s interests and local benefits against the burden that is 
placed on interstate commerce by the legislation.149 
Under the first tier of this legal framework, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held 
that the Act directly regulated transactions taking place outside of Maryland, 
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thereby resulting in “a virtually per se” violation of the DCC.150 However, a plain 
language reading of the relevant portions of the Act, supported by the record, 
warrants a different conclusion. The Act states that “a manufacturer or wholesale 
distributor may not engage in price gouging of an essential off-patent or generic 
drug.”151 Furthermore, the legislature specifically defined essential off-patent or 
generic drug, in part, as a drug “that is actively manufactured and marketed for sale 
in the United States by three or fewer manufacturers , and that is made available 
for sale in the State.”152 This essential language clearly displays that the Act is only 
triggered when there is a drug made available for sale within Maryland.153  
Additionally, since the Act would only be applicable to prices of drugs ultimately 
sold in Maryland, the Act did not “‘insist on price parity with drugs sold outside of 
the state,” and therefore would not have the “practical effect of regulating 
commerce occurring wholly outside of the state.”154 This plain language reading of 
the Act is further supported by Maryland’s repeated assertions on the record that 
the Act “in no way prohibits any of AAM’s members from selling drugs at a 
conscience-shocking price to distributors, to the extent that those drugs are later 
sold” in other states.155 Additionally, Maryland argued that the Act “does not reach, 
or purport to reach any stream of commerce that does not end in Maryland.”156 
Furthermore, the enforcement provisions of the Act relied on the Maryland 
Medical Assistance Program157 notifying the Maryland Attorney General of violating 
increases in prices of essential off-patent or generic drugs.158 The Maryland Medical 
Assistance Program, inter alia, provides “medical and other health care services [to] 
indigent individuals or medically indigent individuals” in Maryland.159 The Secretary 
of this program also administers the Medicare Option Prescription Drug Program.160 
Under the Medicare Option Prescription Drug Program, one of the Secretary’s 
duties is to enter into contracts with prescription drug plans to coordinate the 
Program and Medicare Part D benefits for eligible individuals, of which one of the 
requirements is to be a resident of Maryland.161 The structure of the enforcement 
provisions further displays that the practical effects of the Act would only regulate 
drugs made available for sale within Maryland.162 Additionally, the majority and 
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AAM cite the extraterritoriality doctrine “without adequately engaging with the fact 
that [the Act] could only give rise to liability when a drug is made available for sale 
in Maryland.”163 
Moreover, AAM’s true concerns with the Act were rooted in fears about its 
members’ current distribution and business practices.164 According to AAM, their 
members do not track where their drugs were ultimately offered for sale, and 
therefore, do not know which of their drugs would end up for sale in Maryland.165 
Thus, compliance with the Act would require their members to “have to ‘rejigger’ 
their business practices,” resulting in business conduct wholly outside of 
Maryland.166 However, this argument is extremely unpersuasive in light of the fact 
that many manufacturers  of many different goods have to change their business 
practices to “conform to differing state requirements.”167 Additionally, for a sector 
of the economy that between 2006 and 2015 increased revenue from $534 billion 
to $775 billion,168 the cost of compliance with Maryland’s Act and other state 
regulations appears, on its face, minimal. Furthermore, the Act would not be 
regulating manufacturers’ ability to make profits, but would regulate “the ability of 
[manufacturers] to extract excessive profits by price-gouging Maryland consumers 
on essential drugs for which there is limited competition.”169 Therefore, the Act only 
sought to regulate drug manufacturers’ products that were ultimately made 
available for sale within Maryland170 in order to protect its citizens from abusive 
price gouging practices. 
B.  Maryland Has a Great Public Interest in Regulating Generic Prescription 
Drug Manufacturers  
Under the second tier of the DCC inquiry, Maryland’s local benefits in regulating 
unconscionable prescription drug price increases clearly outweigh any burden 
imposed on interstate commerce. The undue burden tier of the DCC inquiry states 
that “where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
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public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits.”171 When applying this balancing test, the Fourth 
Circuit held in Star172 that it considers; “(1) the nature of the local benefits advanced 
by the statute; (2) the burden placed on interstate commerce by the statute; and 
(3) whether the burden is ‘clearly excessive’ when weighed against [the] local 
benefits.”173 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the limitations on 
states’ regulatory powers created by the DCC “is by no means absolute.”174 The 
Court’s reasoning stems from its recognition that states hold “reserved powers to 
legislate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”175 In addition, 
consumer protection legislation has traditionally been subject to state regulation, 
and therefore “courts should be particularly hesitant to interfere with a State’s 
efforts to protect consumers under the guise of the dormant Commerce Clause.”176 
The Maryland legislature passed the Act “to protect Marylanders from the 
imposition of unconscionable price increases” for certain generic drugs, which 
resulted from “market failure and dysfunction.”177 The Act’s introduction followed 
the release of two federal government reports detailing the “price-gouging of off-
patent drugs.” The Senate report detailed the “substantial burdens” that have been 
“imposed on patients and their families.”178 Some of those burdens directly affected 
patients “health, time, emotional well-being, and pocketbooks.”179 For example, 
the report detailed cases where patients were “forced to go without vital medicine 
and experienced[ed] dangerous and sometimes life threatening symptoms as a 
result.”180 Additionally, the GAO report found that “300 of 1,441 established generic 
drugs analyzed had at least one extraordinary price increase of 100 percent.”181 
Furthermore, of the drugs that experienced an extraordinary price increase, “48 of 
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those drugs had a price increase of 500 percent, and 15 of the drugs had a price 
increase of 1,000 percent or higher.”182 In addition, those extraordinary price 
increases generally lasted for at least one year with most having no downward 
pricing movement after this increase.183 For example, methazolmide, a drug used 
to treat glaucoma “experienced a price increase of approximately 454 percent from 
about $0.33 per tablet…to $1.85 per tablet” in 2011, and by 2015 “the drug’s price 
had further increased… [to] $5.47 per tablet.”184 
When applying the Star balancing test, it is clear that the Act’s local benefits 
outweigh possible burdens on interstate commerce. For example, in 2014, 
Maryland had 891,411 Medicare beneficiaries185 and spent $10,857,000 in total on 
Medicare.186 Additionally, in 2018 Maryland spent $11,496,573,841187 on Medicaid 
and had a total Medicaid enrollment of 1,165,777.188 By preventing companies from 
unconscionably raising the price of generic drugs, the Act would have likely saved 
the state and consumers money by preventing abusive pricing to continue. 
Furthermore, before the Act was passed, a 2016 poll showed that 84 percent of 
Maryland voters were in favor of prescription drug price transparency and legal 
action by the Office of the Attorney General.189 
Moreover, some of the drugs covered by the Act’s prohibition on unconscionable 
price increases are essential life-saving generics, such as EpiPen and Naloxone.190 
EpiPen, a life-saving medication used to treat allergic reactions, had a price increase 
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of 508 percent.191 The Naloxone auto-injector, a life-saving drug that is preferred by 
first responders to treat opioid overdoses, had a price increase of 553 percent.192 
Prescription drug costs in 2015 hit a record high of $57 billion, and according to 
some projections, could surpass $600 billion by 2020.193 Furthermore, in 2015, the 
top 50 pharmaceutical companies spent 558 percent more on sales, marketing, and 
administration then on research and development.194 
Out of control drug prices are not limited to Maryland, and other states have 
sought legislation to address this abusive industry pattern and practice. According 
to the National Conference of State Legislatures, more than a dozen other states 
have filed legislation for a state law similar to Maryland’s Anti-Price Gouging Act 
that could block or restrict generic drug price gouging.195 The Connecticut Attorney 
General’s office even launched an investigation that has culminated in a coalition 
of forty-five states filing a suit alleging that generic pharmaceutical companies 
engaged in price-fixing.196 
Moreover, the district court noted that when faced with the second tier of the 
DCC analysis, AAM did not even present an argument that the Act was 
unconstitutional.197 The nature of the Act is to protect Marylanders and their 
families from the ramifications of unconscionable generic prescription drug price 
increases that appear entirely outside of their control. The burden on the 
manufacturers, which gross billions of dollars in profits each year, to comply with 
the regulation remains unpersuasive, and supported by AAM’s lack of argument as 
to the balancing test, the local benefits clearly appear to outweigh any burden 
placed on interstate commerce. Therefore, the district court correctly held that the 
Act was a constitutional exercise of Maryland’s police powers to protect its citizens 
from greed and systemic failures, and the Fourth Circuit was incorrect to find a 
violation of the DCC.198 
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C.  The Supreme Court, the 4th Circuit, and Sister Circuits have limited the 
Extraterritoriality Principle in Modern Commerce 
Various courts have delivered more stringent holdings that limit the reach of the 
DCC’s extraterritoriality principle when challenged by various state regulations. 
Arguably one of the most relevant of those holdings in relation to AAM’s challenge 
of the Maryland Anti-Price Gouging Statute is the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Pharma Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh.199 The Court held that the 
extraterritoriality principle was not applicable, because “unlike control or 
affirmation statutes, ‘the Maine Act [did] not regulate the price of any out-of-state 
transaction’” expressly or by inevitable effect.200 In upholding the Maine Rx 
program, the Court emphasized that Maine was not “tying the price of its in-state 
products to out-of-state prices,” and was not insisting manufacturers “sell their 
drugs to wholesalers for a certain price.”201 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the rule from Brown-Forman, Healy, and Baldwin did not apply because those cases 
dealt with regulations seeking pricing parity with out-of-state goods.202 
Although the majority held Maryland’s reading of Walsh as too narrow,203 the 
extraterritoriality principle has also been limited across the circuits.204 In the Tenth 
Circuit, when faced with a DCC challenge to Colorado’s renewable energy 
mandate,205 now Justice Gorsuch stated that when assessing Brown-Forman, Healy, 
and Baldwin, all three cases presented “(1) a price control or price affirmation 
regulation, (2) linking in-state prices to those charged elsewhere, with (3) the effect 
of raising costs for out-of-state consumers or rival business.”206 Ultimately, the 
Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s regulation and ruled against the extraterritoriality 
principle, stating that the regulation “just didn’t share any of the three essential 
characteristics that mark those cases: it isn’t a price control statute, it doesn’t link 
prices paid [in-state] with those paid out-of-state, and it does not discriminate 
against out-of-staters.”207 
Similarly, in Ass’n Des Eleverus De Canards Et D’Oies Du Quebec v. Harris,208 the 
Ninth Circuit ruled against another extraterritorial DCC challenge. In Harris, 
producers of foie gras challenged a California statute “banning the sale of products 
that are the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal 
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size.”209 The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s holding from Walsh, to 
conclude that “Healy and Baldwin are not applicable to a statute that does not 
dictate the price of a product and does not ‘tie the price of its in-state products to 
out-of-state prices.’”210 
Additionally, the Second Circuit struck down another DCC challenge based on the 
extraterritoriality principle in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. Sorrell.211 In Sorrell, an 
association of lamp-manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of Vermont’s 
legislation requiring “manufacturers of some mercury-containing products to label 
their products and packaging to inform consumers that the products contain 
mercury, and on disposal, should be recycled or disposed of as hazardous waste.”212 
The Second Circuit ultimately held that the association’s extraterritoriality 
challenge failed “because the statute [did] not inescapably require manufacturers 
to label all lamps wherever distributed.”213 In coming to its holding, the Second 
Circuit reasoned that Vermont’s statute does not mention any other states for any 
purpose, “unlike the restrictions involved in the Supreme Court’s price-regulation 
cases.”214 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit in Star refused to uphold an extraterritoriality 
challenge.215 In Star, a cigarette manufacturer challenged the constitutionality of 
the Master Settlement Agreement between forty-six states and major tobacco 
manufacturers, as well as a Virginia statute that imposed a pre-cigarette escrow 
obligation on those manufacturers.216 The manufacturer in Star argued that the 
statute would require it to make payments on cigarettes sold to independent 
distributors in other states, therefore violating the extraterritoriality doctrine 
against placing burdens on interstate commerce through transactions occurring 
outside of Virginia.217 Additionally, the manufacturer rested its argument on the 
extraterritoriality doctrine that “a statute that directly controls commerce occurring 
wholly outside the boundaries of a state exceeds the inherent limits” of the state’s 
authority, despite the state legislature’s intent.218 The Fourth Circuit rejected these 
 
 209. Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris 729 F.3d 937, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 210. Harris, 729 F.3d at 951 (the California Statute “does not impose any prices for duck liver products and 
does not tie prices for California liver products to out-of-state prices.”). 
 211. 272 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 212. National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 213. Id. at 110 (“To the extent the statute may be said to ‘require’ labels on lamps sold outside Vermont, 
then, it is only because the manufacturers are unwilling to modify their production and distribution systems to 
differentiate between Vermont-bound and non-Vermont-bound lamps. To avoid the statute’s alleged impact 
on other states, lamp manufacturers could arrange their production and distribution processes to produce 
labeled lamps solely for the Vermont market . . .”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Star, 278 F.3d. at 362. 
 216. Id. at 345. 
 217. Id. at 354 
 218. Id. at 355–56 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336. (1989)). 
 Association for Accessible Medicines v. Brian E. Frosh 
212 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
arguments, holding that the Virginia statute “specifically limits its applicability to 
the sale of cigarettes” within Virginia, and did not regulate upstream transactions 
because a fee would only be placed on cigarettes actually sold within the State.219 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia’s statute was not a per se 
violation of the DCC, because any effects of the law were not applicable to out-of-
state distributors that did not sell cigarettes in Virginia.220 Lastly, the statute did not 
have any “practical effect of controlling prices or transactions occurring wholly 
outside” of Virginia because the statute did not insist on “price parity” with out-of-
state distributors.221 
CONCLUSION 
In Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, the Fourth Circuit held the Act was 
unconstitutional because it was a per se violation of the extraterritoriality principle 
of the dormant Commerce Clause.222 The Fourth Circuit incorrectly decided the case 
because it failed to apply its own precedent and the extraterritoriality principle in 
full to weigh the local benefits of the Act against any burdens that might be placed 
on interstate commerce.223 The Fourth Circuit should have held under the balancing 
test that the local benefits of the Act far outweigh the abusive and exploitative 
practices of the pharmaceutical industry to unconscionably raise the prices of 
essential and life-saving drugs on Maryland consumers.224 As a result of this opinion, 
Marylander’s who are in the most dire need of affordable medication will still face 
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